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THE OIL PRODUCING NATIONS' EMERGING RIGHT
TO DETERMINE OIL PRICES
DR. SAYED M. HosNI*
I.
It is a fairly recent development in the petroleum industry
that the oil producing states of the Middle East have acted
together' to claim the right to price oil sold to the consuming
industrial nations and "concessionaire ' 2 oil companies. The first
concerted action occurred in November of 1973, following the
Arab-Israeli War in October of that year, only after lengthy and
strenuous negotiations failed to produce an agreement on price
increases. More than two years earlier, in February, 1971, six
of the OPEC countries declared that they would implement
through legislation or legal measures3 what they considered to
be a minimum level of oil prices in the Arabian Gulf area. This
declaration also followed extensive negotiations between the pro-
ducing countries and the oil companies on the subject of price
increases.4 Only after these companies showed unbending re-
* Research Scholar, Columbia University; a former Legal Advisor to the OPEC
and Delegate to the Third United Nations Conference on The Law of The Sea.
1. See Resolution XXXV. 160 of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the OPEC
Conference, held in Vienna Sept. 15, 16 ,1973; Supplement No. XLIII 54-55. In
this resolution the Conference noted that in light of the projected future trends in
crude oil markets, world wide inflation, etc., the present level of posted prices was
not compatible with these conditions and required an "upward adjustment." The
Conference then resolved to organize a Ministerial Committee to negotiate collectively
the terms of the new agreements with the oil companies.
2. As one observer has pointed out, there is no agreed definition of the term
"concession" in international law. For a survey of the various uses of concessions in
different legal systems, see S. TORIGUIAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 17-41 (1972). In a general sense, the term embraces "franchise,
license, patent, charter, monopoly and grant." Id. at 34.
3. For the full text of the February 14, 1971 Teheran Oil Tax-Price Agreement
and an "appraisal" and synopsis of the terms of the Agreement, see 24 MIDDLE EAST
EcoN. SURVEY No. 17, at 4 (Feb. 18, 1971). See also 10 PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY No. 8 (Feb. 22, 1971).
4. Actually, the negotiations started immediately after the Libyan increases
were agreed to in October 1970. Subsequently the owners of IPC announced slight
increases of their own posted prices of Iraqi crude. The oil producers were not
satisfied with the increases implemented and, starting with Iran, forced the oil
companies to enter into negotiations immediately.
(154)
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sistence to the demanded increases was unilateral action declared
by the producing countries.5
This turbulent period represents a significant phase in the
struggle of producing countries to attain the right to determine
the price of their oil. It is characterized by the assertion of the
right by the oil producing countries to share in the decision
making process, while simultaneously wielding every possible
bargaining point to have preferred price levels accepted by the
oil companies. Saudi Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani has de-
scribed this period as one where the oil companies recognized
that they had to share the power of price determination with
the producing countries.6
The struggle to gain control over pricing has met with some
success. In 1970, Libya sought to increase posted oil prices and
tax rates by wielding its power in negotiations. Occidental Oil
Company, a small independent, finally agreed to the higher levels.
The remaining concessionaire companies eventually followed
suit - the majors being the last - again under threatened cuts
and suspension of production.
Whether through outright unilateral action or through pres-
sured negotiating tactics, the producing countries convincingly
5. The Twenty-Second Conference (Extraordinary) held in Teheran Feb. 3,
4, 1971 (See Supplement XXXI) resolved that
In the event that any oil company concerned fails to comply with these legal
and/or legislative measures within seven days from the date of their adoption
in all countries concerned, Member Countries, Abu Dhabi, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, shall take appropriate measures in-
cluding total embargo on the shipment of crude oil and petroleum products by such
company.
6. The process by which the oil companies ceded much of their power to the
producer countries accelerated during the 1960s and 1970s. It was after the Teheran
Agreement that the oil companies recognized that the governments of the producing
nations demanded an active role in setting prices. See Yamani, The Oil Industry
in Transition, 3 NAT. REs. LAW. 396 (1975).
7. The independent oil companies, among them Occidental, were much more
economically vulnerable to governmental pressures. Occidental derived close to one-
third of its earnings from the Libyan venture and, unlike the major oil companies,
it could not fall back on alternative sources of supply. Occidental could not, as
Mr. Mikdashi points out, endure a drastic cut in oil production without suffering.
heavy losses. The Libyan leadership took a series of "conservative measures" in
June and August- of 1970 which cut back Occidental's production levels by 45%.
A settlement was reached quickly; its terms were announced in September, 1970,
and the company was allowed to resume normal production levels. For an expanded
account of these negotiations, see Z. MIKDASHI, THE COMmUNITY, OF OIL EXPORTING
COUNTRIES (1972).
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proved that the concessionaire oil companies no longer have the
exclusive right to determine oil prices. It was no surprise in
1973, following the Arab oil embargo, that the producing coun-
tries did not wait for a final answer to their demands for revised
price levels. Secure in their negotiating position, they felt free
to announce unilaterally the increases they saw fit. Describing
this final shift in power, Minister Yamani wrote:
By 1973, when the Teheran Agreement became meaningless
by reason of developments, the power to determine prices
was vested solely in the hands of the producers.8
This fact was also recognized by Mr. F. Houari Boumediene,
President of the Revolutionary Council and the Council of
Ministers of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, in his
address to the United Nations General Assembly:
[F]or the first time in history developing countries have
been able to take the liberty of fixing the prices of their raw
materials themselves.9
It is clear that the OPEC countries now understand this
power to be an attribute of their sovereign right of ownership.
This was forcibly enunciated in the Solemn Declaration Con-
cerning the International Economic Crisis of the OPEC Summit
Conference in March 1975. The text of the relevant portion
of the declaration is worth quoting:
The sovereigns and heads of state reaffirm the solidarity
which unites their countries in safeguarding the legitimate
rights and interests of their peoples, reasserting the sovereign
and inalienable right of their countries to the ownership,
exploitation and pricing of their natural resources and re-
jecting any idea or attempt that challenges those funda-
mental rights and, thereby, the sovereignty of their countries
(emphasis added) .o
This same position is held by Mr. Boumediene, although his
reasoning differs somewhat. Enumerating guidelines for accel-
8. Yamani, supra note 6, at 396.
9. 6 U.N. GAOR 2208 (1974).
10. Solemn Declaration of the Sovereigns and Heads of State of the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 566, 567 (1975).
DETERMINATION OF OIL PRIcEs
erated growth and development, he emphasized the principle
that:
... [t]he developing countries must take over their natural
resources, which implies, essentially, nationalizing the ex-
ploitation of these resources and controlling the machinery
governing the determination of their prices. (emphasis
added) "I
The right to determine oil prices in Boumediene's view is an
indispensible extension of the right of nationalization:
Thus we see that the power to fix prices and the control
of the related mechanisms are corollaries to the goal of
recovering natural resources and are, therefore, indispensible
extensions of naturalization. (emphasis added)12
The right of nationalization itself, stated Mr. Boumediene, is a
consequence of the right of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources:
In accordance with the principle of permanent sovereignty
of peoples over their natural resources, the United Nations
has formally and solemnly recognized and proclaimed the
right of Nationalization.13
Under this analysis, then, the right of a producing country
to determine the price of its oil, itself, a direct derivation of the
intervening right of nationalization, rests ultimately on the pro-
claimed right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
II.
The radical nature of this shift in power is better appreciated
when contrasted with the history of the traditional concession
arrangement. This arrangement totally excluded the producing
host countries from any form of participation.
Beginning with the introduction of the concession system
to the Middle East in 1901,14 the concessionaire companies acted
11. 6 U.N. GAOR supra note 9, at para. 84.
12. Id. at 7 para. 96.
13. Id. at 6 para. 93.
14. The oil concession to W.K. D'Arcy in 1901 "was the first effective con-
cession that resulted in the discovery and production of oil in the region." H. CATTAn,
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on the assumption that they alone held all rights under their
concessions to determine the price of the oil they extracted. The
concession was the legal basis of all rights in the oil; it was a
grant of the exclusive right to search for, obtain, exploit, develop,
render suitable for trade, carry away, export and sell petroleum
and other materials. The terms just enumerated were common
in the traditional concession system and were contained in vir-
tually every agreement concluded with a Middle Eastern host
country.15 The grant made by such terms was interpreted to
mean that the host government had alienated the legal rights
of possession and ownership in the mineral itself.16 It has even
been speculated that the concession passed ownership in the
oil before it was extracted. 17
This one-sided arrangement prevailed and was operative until
1960, when the oil producers joined together in response to the
companies' unilateral price cuts and formed the OPEC alliance.' 8
THE EVOLUTION OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 1
(1967).
15. See id. at 2. The grants usually included, at least implicitly, extensive
territorial control. Rare was the explicit provision limiting the territorial boundaries
within which the companies should operate. The duration of the early concessions
was similarly extensive. The Iranian concession to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was
typical; it was agreed to continue through 1993. M. MUGHRABY, PERMANENT
SOVEREIGNTY OVER OIL RESOURCES: A STUDY OF MIDDLE EAST OIL CONCESSIONS
AND LEGAL CHANGE 49-50 (1966).
16. H. CATTAN, THE LAW OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA 21 (1967). An express provision substantiating this interpretation
was incorporated in some agreements, but exceptions to it have been noted.
17. At least one agreement was quoted to support the idea that it did. Article
23 of the Iranian Offshore Agreement of 1965 expressly stated that the petroleum
produced is owned by the partied at the well head. See CATTAN, supra note 14, at
21 n.5.
18. The oil price cuts in 1959 and 1960 were the moving force behind the creation
of the OPEC alliance.
The August 1960 posted price cuts implied an imputed 'loss of tax proceeds' to
Middle East host governments of 4 cents a barrel assuming an inelastic demand;
this 'loss' was imputed at some $300 million for exports over the period of August
1960 to the end of 1963. Following this price reduction, representatives from the
governments of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela conferred in an
atmosphere of crisis in Bagdad from 10 to 14 September 1960.
MIKDASHI, supra note 7, at 33. At this meeting, the decision to form OPEC was
made.
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It is a well-accepted fact that the concessionaire companies con-
sidered the power to determine oil prices a mere administrative
prerogative incidental to their power to manage the concession."
As late as the 1962-64 negotiations, a major oil company argued
that while it had the administrative power to raise posted prices
to their pre-August 1960 level, it would be reluctant to do so.2 0
There is support for this view of the oil companies' power
over pricing even among authors who are not typically pro-
ponents of the oil companies' point of view. Mr. S. Toriguian, a
Lebanese jurist, has written that in the Middle Eastern con-
cession system actual ownership of the oil passes to the con-
cessionaire companies. 21 He cites, as examples, provisions from
the Petroleum Law of Iran, enacted as recently as 1957.
Another writer, Henry Cattan, has maintained that "[iln
effect, an oil concession entails the alienation, present or eventual,
of the right of possession and ownership of a State-owned min-
eral. ' 22 There is, he notes, but one exception to this pattern:
The NIOC-ERAP Agreement of August 27, 1966 constitutes
the only exception in this regard. It does not confer upon
the partner in the joint venture any right of ownership of
a part of the oil which is discovered and produced, but gives
19. See Jersey, Middle East Oil Revenues in Relation to the Price of Imported
Goods, Sept. 16, 1969, at 8 (unpublished, as cited in MIKDASHI, supra note 7 at 146).
MIKDASHI, supra note 7, at 145-46.
20. The company's reluctance to raise prices was based on the existing market
conditions of excess availability of supplies and stiff price competition. It feared
that the added costs of increasing the price of crude would not be recovered through
resulting higher prices to the consumer because of these market conditions. See
MIKDASHI, supra note 7, at 145-6.
21. See TORIGUIAN, supra note 2, at 49. Art. 11, I of the Iranian Petroleum
Law of 1957 provides:
• . . Petroleum produced by an operator from wells within an area held by it,
upon production at the well head, shall become the property of the operator.
He also cites a Western Hemisphere example which is atypical of Middle Eeastern
concessions. Article 3 of the Venezuelan Laf of Hydrocarbons of 1955 provides:
"Exploration - exploitation concessions and those of exploitation do not confer
omnership of the deposits, but only constitute a real right to explore the area
granted and to exploit, for a definite period, the deposits that may be found there-
in, in accordance, fith this law and the title to the concession.
Official Gazette No. 471, Oct 13, 1955.
22. CATTAN, supra note 16, at 21.
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him only the right to purchase from NIOC a portion of the
oil produces. (emphasis added) 23
This agreement was the forerunner of the more modem con-
cept of joint venture24 which producing countries later attempted
to institute to gain control over their basic natural resources.
Their concept was a half-step toward participation, placing limits
on the rights acquired by the concessionaire companies. This
was a distinct departure from the earlier, traditional concession
arrangements.
According to the modem concept the concessionaire com-
pany was limited to a grant of the right "to purchase" a portion
of the oil produced. Clearly, the determination of price was not
to be included among the prerogatives granted. On this specific
point the modem concession arrangement, as cited in the 1966
agreement above, displayed a distinct and radical departure from
the economic tradition dating back to the beginning of the
century.
III.
As instrumental as the interpretations of the oil contracts
are the systems and principles of law which give them life. The
question of what legal principles should govern oil contracts
was one of the major issues facing the newly formed OPEC and
the lack of a satisfactory answer was the irritant source of
problems in several bilateral concession agreements by member
states.25 OPEC nations have never reached a consensus on these
questions of legality, despite the claims of several individual
members. Although a full exposition of the various theories on
this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, several matters
are particularly relevant to the question of who has the power
to set oil prices.
It has been observed that "[e]ven in the same country it
can happen that different oil concessions are governed by dif-
23. Id., n.5.
24. The joint venture model developed as a means for reconciling the aspirations
of the producing countries for greater control and revenue with corporate investment
requirements. The formulation of the theory expressed the desire of the participating
governments to limit the authority of the concessionaires and to have a more direct
influence on the development of their prime economic resource. See MUGHRABY, supra
note 15, at 55-56.
25. See From Concessions to Contracts, paper presented at Fifth Arab Petroleum
Congress, Cairo, Mar. 1965, cited in CATTAN, supra note 16.
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ferent laws and legal principles. 26 It has often been said that the
legal systems of the Middle East countries, during the times
of the traditional oil concessions, were underdeveloped, even
embryonic. 2 7 Nevertheless, pinpointing the nature of the rights
granted by a traditional concession as interpreted under Islamic
law aids in the analysis of modem agreements.
According to their own provisions, the traditional concession
agreements were to be interpreted in light of general principles
of law, principles of law common to the two countries, or, as
one concession stipulated, according to the judicial principles
contained in Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice.28 It is not clear exactly what was in-
tended by these clauses, but since the great majority of the
Middle Eastern countries follow the Islamic law generally, prob-
lems of resorting to Islamic law for interpretation of concession
agreements naturally arose. It is particularly instructive to ex-
amine the treatment given the application of Islamic law to
oil contracts in arbitrations involving one or more of the Islamic
states. The arbitrators generally concluded that Islamic law
affords very little guidance on the principles of law applicable
to the concession agreements and particularly little on the specific
nature of rights granted therein.
Sir Alfred Bucknill, the referee in the dispute between the
Ruler of Qatar and the International Marine Oil Company, wrote
in the award he rendered on June 23, 1953:
[I]n my opinion, after hearing the evidence of the two
experts in Islamic law, Mr. Anderson and Professor Milliot,
'there is no settled body of legal principles in Qatar appli-
cable to the construction of modern commercial instru-
ments. 29
26. The issue of applicable law presents some complex legal problems. There
is extensive disagreement over whether the domestic law of the contracting state
prevails over international law, and over the relative merits of contract law and
administrative law. For further discussion see CATTAN, supra note 16, at 31-32.
27. Islamic law lacked any precedent for contractual relations between non-
-private parties. There were similar deficiencies in the Islamic law of taxation. Thus,
sophisticated economic agreements were made in a virtual legal vacuum. See
MUGHRABY, supra note 15, at 48.
28. This was a requirement in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. concession of 1933
(Art. 22). See CATTAN, supra note 16, at 62.
29. Ruler of Qatar v. Int'l Marine Oil Co., 20 I.L.R. 634, 544 (Sir Alfred
Bucknill. Referee) ; June 1953.
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Also referring to Professor Milliot's opinion on Islamic law, the
referee said further:
According to Professor Milliot, the Principal Agreement was
full of irregularities from end to end, according to Islamic
law, as applied to Qatar. This is a cogent reason for saying
that such law does not contain a body of legal principles
applicable to a modern commercial contract.8 0
The same conclusion was reached by the arbitrator in the
dispute between the Shiekh of Abu Dhabi and the Petroleum
Development Company in 1951.31 In the arbitration between
the Government of Saudi Arabia and Aramco, the arbitration
tribunal observed that "the regime of mining concessions, and,
consequently, also of oil concessions, has remained embryonic
in Moslem law. .. .
In addition to the arbitrators, it is the opinion of several
legal scholars that Islamic Law provides little guidance concern-
ing rights and duties of parties to concession agreements. Two
Lebanese jurists, H. Cattan and S. Toriguian, devoted valuable
chapters to the study of the provisions of Islamic law and their
relation to oil concessions.13 Both authors came to the conclusion
that no comprehensive set of rules exists in Islamic law to handle
the more complicated aspects of the modem concessionary sys-
tem. Mr. Toriguian, not satisfied with these observations, called
for further studies of the applicability of certain provisions of
Islamic law to oil concessions.3 4
30. Id. at 545.
31. Petroleum Devtlopment, Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144, 149
(Lord Asquith of Bishopstone, Umpire) ; Sept. 1951, 1 I.C.L.Q. 247, 250 (1952).
32. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco) ; Arbitration Tribunal
of Aug. 23, 1958; Award of the Arbitration Tribunal, 27 I.L.R. 117, 163.
33. ToRIGUIAN, supra note 2, ch. IV., and CATTAN, supra note 16, at ch. III.
34. Mr. Toriguian stresses the importance of a thorough knowledge and study
of Islamic law for several reasons. It is essential in view of the religious hold it
has on the peoples of the Middle East, and it is helpful in the smooth running of the
"multifarious activities" that accompany an oil concession. Finally it is important
to have a working knowledge of Islamic law "since it is maintained that the 'proper
law' of concessionary agreements should be the principles of law common to the
systems of the law of the parties, on equitable grounds and on the ground that more
and more agreements are making express provisions in the text itself to this effect."
TORIGUIAN, supra note 2, at 110-11.
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The learned modern Islamic jurist, Sheikh Mohamed Abu
Zahara, has noted that the concept of a concession is legally
supported by the Islamic legal institution of "iqt'a."35 There
is some confusion, however, in describing the nature of the legal
right conferred by such an institution, whether it be the right
to take possession of the mineral or the right to own it. The
learned Sheikh said:
In such an "iqt'a" the leader of the Moslem community
(Imam) grants permission to one or more persons to explore
a specified area and take out whatever minerals he may
discover.3 6
There is nothing in this explanation of "iqt'a" to suggest
that the grant confers absolute ownership to the concessionaire
company, and certainly no reservation of the right to determine
price. In fact, the discussion of the legal principles involved is
quite confused on the precise nature of the right established by
a mineral discovery in a concession area. At one point in Sheikh
Abu Zahara's opinion, he allows that "the concessionaire has
the best claim to it." In another, it is "his property," and in a
third, "the concessionaire has the right to continue to take the
mineral and no other person to compete with him for it. ' ' 3T He
cites as his authority the celebrated Islamic source, Tashih
al-Furu - a source quoted often by the commentators.38 It is
the opinion of this author that this text leaves much to be said
on the question whether rights accruing as a result of discovery
are rights of ownership or rights of priority to purchase the oil.
Indeed, the question of who has the power to determine the price
of the mineral discovered is not examined by any of the sources
35. Arbitration between Aramco and the Government of Saudi Arabia, Transcript
of Arbitration Proceedings, Vol. II, p. 761. (unpublished). See quoted portions
discussed in CATTAN, supra note 16, at 55-58. See also TORIGUIAN, supra note 2,
at 100. Mr. Toriguian explains that "Iqt'a" is a verbal noun of the verb Qata's
meaning to cut: "A concession was named an Iqt'a because by conferring an exclusive
right upon an individual concerning a certain plot of land, the Moslem community
was cut off from the benefits of the land in question."
36. See CATTAN, supra note 16, at 57.
37. Id. at 57-58.
38. Id.
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mentioned. If there is any conclusion to be gleaned from the
work of arbitrators and scholars, it is that Islamic law fails to
lend unequivocal support to the notion that actual ownership
of oil extracted under contract passes to the concessionaire com-
pany. For these reasons it is easy to agree with the idea advanced
above that further studies on this matter are needed without
sympathizing with the claim that Islamic law remained "em-
bryonic" or too underdeveloped to cope with this problem.
For modern purposes, the analysis of pertinent Islamic law
must take into account some very significant developments in
the international petroleum industry and international law. The
problem of what Islamic law principles, if any, are applicable
to the oil concessions in the Middle East has lost its importance
as a result of changes in the constitutional and legal systems of
those countries.
The problem which results from the dearth of legal rules or
even the divergence of principles between Islamic schools
with regard to mines and minerals has now been largely
solved in practice in the Arab countries either by constitu-
tional provisions or mineral and petroleum laws and, in their
absence, by custom. 9
Another development important to the modern analysis of
oil pricing is the fact that most of the producing countries have
become owners of controlling interests in the equity of the oil
companies operating in the Middle East, and have also estab-
lished effective control over their management of the conces-
sionaire companies. Indeed, most of these companies are soon
to be owned outright through the system of participation so
persistently expounded by Minister Lamani. ° It has been ob-
served that with this change in controlling interest, the question
of applicable law, and particularly the legal relationship between
39. See CATTrA, supra note 16, at 58.
40. By means of the so-called participation principle, the governments of the
producer countries have gradually increased their equity interests in the concession
companies. The companies acquiesced to these evolutionary takeovers when the pro-
ducers unilaterally initiated the Participation Agreements. Yamani, supra note 6, at
394. Recent developments in these takeover agreements have brought negotiations to
the brink of total ownership. For a report on recent developments, see The Wall
Street Journal, Mar. 8, 1976, at 5, col. 2.
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the State and the oil company, becomes a matter of purely
academic interest.41
The third, and in this writer's opinion, dominant considera-
tion in the analysis of Middle East oil rights is the new develop-
ments in the international law applicable to natural resources
in general. International legal principles in this domain are being
slowly but effectively developed through the various instruments
of the United Nations. This growing body of law will no doubt
apply to the producing states' activities in disposing of their
natural resources. Applicability will be achieved through the
implementation of provisions in local petroleum codes, or through
bilateral concession agreements providing for reliance on princi-
ples of law universally recognized or common to the two legal
systems. These new legal principles will temper the relationship
of the producing countries to the consuming world, with regard
both to the exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources and to the determination of oil prices. 42
It is abundantly clear that this body of law is not only new
and evolving, but also that it falls outside the traditional reach
of international law.43 In a thorough and comprehensive study
of the laws regulating economic activity within the international
system, three noted authorities observed that:
... there is no customary international law imposing duties
and creating correlative rights. ... 44
41. TORIGUIAN, supra note 2, in postscript, 290b.
42. It should be noted, however, that these questions are no longer the concern
solely of the oil companies. As a result of the shift in price determination, the
interests of the industrialized consuming countries have been brought directly into
the struggle. They are expressing these interests by increasingly acting through their
oil companies. Consequently, the issue of oil pricing has become one of terms of trade
and balance of payments between the producing countries and the consuming coun-
tries. See MIKDASHI, supra note 7, at 151.
43. As a body of international law, these principles are still being developed and
for this reason there is considerable controversy as to their binding force. This paper
does not attempt to resolve this controversy. It does refer to this body of law as a
set of general principles common to the legal systems of some, if not most, of the
countries involved in the question of oil price determination. Further, the deter-
mination of oil prices has entered the realm of international economic relations - the
very subject of this evolving body of international law. No longer is pricing a matter
solely between the producing countries and the concessionaire companies, particularly
in light of the fact that the latter have lost their legal basis for asserting ownership
of the oil extracted.
44. CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMs 1035 (Leech,
Oliver and Sweeney eds. 1973).
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This unfortunate conclusion tends to support the claims of some
countries that since oil is now their undisputed property they
have the right and free rein to do with it what they want. If
the sovereignty of all nations were to be interpreted in such an
absolute manner, the world community would quickly be reduced
to economically isolated and selfish units pursuing national in-
terests. Resulting conflicts could only be resolved through force.
The reality of the situation is that countries, while sovereign,
are inescapably interdependent. None can claim complete self-
sufficiency or even the potentiality for it. Again, even though
the principles of law governing international responsibility of
states are not the subject of agreement and have not been
codified, it is clear that tremendous damage can be inflicted by
certain economic measures, such as price increases, embargoes
and the like, resulting, in Secretary Kissinger's words, in an
effective "economic strangulation." Even in asserting their right
to adjust oil prices after failing to obtain satisfactory increases
during negotiation, the producing countries recognized the reality
of interdependence:
[T]he interdependence of nations, as apparent in the world
economic situation, calls for a greater attention to be paid
to international cooperation and [they] declared themselves
ready to contribute, by their efforts, to the objectives of
economic development and stability in the world, in accord-
ance with the declaration and programme of action for the
establishment of a new international economic order . . .
adopted by the General Assembly of the U.S. during its
sixth extraordinary session. 5
In further recognition of the principle of economic inter-
dependence, OPEC has subscribed to the principle that no one
country should be allowed to inflict economic damage or under-
mine the economy of another country through the use of any
economic measures. 0 It has rejected "any allegation attributing
to the price of oil the responsibility for the present instability
of the world economy"47 and condemned attempts to attribute
to OPEC "the intention of undermining the economies of the
45. See Solemn Declaration of OPEC, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 566, 567 (1975).
46. Id. at 568.
47. Id.
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developed countries." 48 Finally, OPEC has declared that it is
"prepared to negotiate the conditions for the stabilization of oil
prices which will enable the consuming countries to make neces-
sary adjustments to their economies." 49
The foregoing quotations from the Solemn Declaration of
OPEC leave no doubt that the member countries subscribe to
the notion that the determination of oil prices is not their exclu-
sive prerogative, nor is their power to legislate absolute. Rather,
they recognize that the stability of the world economy is of
equal concern - to the developed countries for the possible
effect on their industrial economies, and to the producing coun-
tries for their continuing growth. Consequently, oil pricing has
developed into a subject of negotiation and international coopera-
tion based on the undisputed principle of modern coexistence:
interdependence.
These principles have been accepted by a majority of states
in the world community. Numerous instruments passed by the
U.N. General Assembly by overwhelming majorities, when care-
fully analyzed, demonstrate widespread acceptance.
For example, the International Development Strategy for
the Second Development Decade stated that "economic and
social progress is the common and shared responsibility of the
entire international community," 50 and proclaimed that:
every country has the right and duty to develop its human
and natural resources, but the full benefit of its efforts can
be realized only with concomitant and effective international
action."
The same principle was prefaced by the stipulation, on the
specific issue of the power to determine prices, that efforts will
be made to reach agreement ... on a set of general principles
on pricing policy to serve as guidelines for consultations and
actions on the individual commodities. 52 (emphasis added) The
fundamental direction of the Development Strategy was said to
be "aimed primarily at strengthening the sense of interdepend-
ence and partnership implicit in the Concept of the Decade. '53
48. Id. at 569.
49. Id. at 572.
50. G.A. Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8124 (1970).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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The conclusions reached in the foregoing document are
strongly supported by the Declaration of Principles of Inter-
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States.5 4 This declaration purports to spell out basic
principles of international law which merely clarify and apply
the broader principles of the U.N. Charter.55 Describing the duty
of states to cooperate with one another in accordance with the
Charter, it provides that:
States have the duty to cooperate with each other, irre-
spective of their political, economic and social systems, in
the various spheres of international relations, in order to
maintain international peace and security and to promote
international economic stability and progress, the general
welfare of nations and international cooperation free from
discrimination based on such differences. (emphasis added) 5"
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 7
adopted by the Twenty-ninth Session of the United Nations
General Assembly, is even more specific about the responsibility
of interdependence. It is repeatedly stressed in the Preamble
that the general aims of the charter are international coopera-
tion, finding solutions to international problems, particularly in
the economic sphere, and urging that the new economic order
be based, inter alia, on the close interrelationship of the interests
of all states.5 8 After specifying the duty to cooperate in the con-
duct of international economic relations, 9 the charter asserts that
all states are juridically equal and that each therefore has the
right to participate in decision-making processes geared to the
solution of world economic, financial and monetary problems.60
The effect of this provision is to limit the exclusive power of any
one state to set commodity prices which would have such an
impact on the world economy as to cause a monetary problem
or a shortage crisis.
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties specifically
imposes on every state, in addition to the duty of cooperation,
54. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
55. Id. at 123.
56. Id.
57. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
58. Id., Preamble
59. Id., Articles 8 and 9.
60. Id., Article 10.
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the duty to contribute to the development of international trade.
One of the means it recommends is the creation of long-term
multilateral commodity agreements in which the interests of the
producers are taken into consideration. In such negotiations,
all states have the responsibility to see to it that the natural
flow of trade is promoted, that the parties are reasonable and
conscious of the interests of the two sides involved, and that
equitable and remunerative prices are agreed upon."
The Charter is replete with appeals for consultation and
negotiation between the parties concerned before a final price is
determined on any commodity. 2 It makes clear that the oil pro-
ducing countries cannot remain indifferent to world concern in
the determination of oil prices. However, interdependence, a
reality firmly set in the present world economic order, deserves
a larger role than that assigned to it in the Preamble to the
Charter. It would be placed more appropriately with the fifteen
principles enumerated in the first chapter, entitled "Funda-
mentals of International Economic Relations."' 3 Since this list
of principles was not intended as an exhaustive treatment of the
fundamentals of international economic relations, interdepend-
ence should be added to take a dominant position among them.
All of the foregoing declarations refer to the need to co-
operate, to take into consideration the interests of the world
community in general, and, by implication, to give special con-
sideration to the possibly harmful effects of independent eco-
nomic action. In the matter of oil price determination, these
principles mandate consultation and negotiation. Once mechan-isms for consultation and negotiation are instituted, either bi-
laterally or multilaterally, the final determination of price would
be left to the country or countries which own the oil. This latter
step is a logical one in a world composed of independent, sovereign
states.
It should be noted, however, that the action of the oil pro-
ducing states in November of 1973 cannot be considered the type
of action to which these principles apply. In the first place, that
action was not a "determination de novo" of the price. Rather,
it was an adjustment of inequitable prices which had long pre-
vailed through the sheer monopolistic power of the concessionaire
61. Id., Article 6.
62. Id., Preamble, para. 4.
63. Id., Chapter 1.
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oil companies. The increases sought, as well as those sought
by the Teheran Agreement of 1971, were meant, as Minister
Yamani wrote:
to redress the economic inequity that was inherent in the
original concession and subsequent related agreements.64
The oil companies themselves, in their concerted offer to OPEC
representatives on January 16, 1971, during the Teheran Nego-
tiations qualified those increases as a revision of the posted
prices.6 5 Second, those increases were introduced only after
lengthy and painful negotiations. Indeed, the two increases
which preceded the unilateral act of price determination in No-
vember 1973, were, despite the pressure and threats, agreed to
by the oil companies.66
In addition, the unilateral price determination was made
within the context of the producing countries' relations with the
concessionaire oil companies. The consuming nations, not in-
volved in the negotiations, acted on the premise that oil pricing
was a private activity to be handled by the producing countries
and the concessionaire companies, making gestures of mediation
or support only when the need arose. Only when negotiations
for those increases were stalled in Teheran did the consuming
nations become so concerned with the prices that they actually
met in Paris in January, 1971 .6 At that time, President Nixon
sent a high-level government emissary to Saudi Arabia, Iran and
Kuwait with the object of urging those countries - presumed
to be friendly to the United States - to adopt a reasonable
attitude that might produce reasonable oil prices. 8 A member
of the U.S. Senate, commenting on the visits of those emissaries
to the three oil producing countries, said that the U.S. Govern-
ment was "working hand and glove with officers of the big inter-
national oil companies to force OPEC to sell their single resource
64. The producer countries sought to enlarge their share of the profits of the
oil production enterprise inasmuch as this was thought to be fair and equitable given
the historical context in which the concessions were made. Yamani, supra note 6,
at 394.
65. See Text of Oil Companies' Message to OPEC States, 10 PETROLEUM INTELLI-
GENCE WEEKLY, No. 4. Jan. 25, 1971, at 6.
66. Id.
67. See OPEC Faced with Collective Bargaining and Nixon Moves to Aid
Foreign Oil Talks, 69 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, Jan. 25, 1971, at 82-85.
68. See Is Cartel Next for Oilmen? BUSINESS WEEK, 23 January 1971, 70-71.
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for bargain basement prices." '69 The attitude of the U.S. Govern-
ment demonstrates the failure of the consuming countries to
perceive their right to have a say in the determination of oil
prices. Since this is a right called for and protected by principles
of international law, it belongs to States alone and not to private
parties.
It is unfortunate that, perhaps as a result of the failure of
the consuming countries to recognize their rights, at the time
the oil producing countries took action there was no international
forum set up to deal with problems of oil pricing. It was only
as a result of those price increases and the world outcry against
them that the consuming nations rallied in Washington and
formed the International Energy Agency.70 Similarly, a dialogue
between the producing and consuming countries was not begun
until an exchange of recriminations left the parties at an im-
passe.71 Even then negotiations went slowly and remained out-
side the framework of any U.N. mediation. In the future one
hopes that a permanent forum for dealing with the exercise of
these rights to negotiate oil prices can be instituted within the
framework of the United Nations. The sovereign rights of pro-
ducing states and the vital interests of the industrial consuming
nations must be provided a legal-diplomatic forum of regulation
in the interests of world economic stability. The rights of all
sides are dictated by the principles of global coexistence and
should be afforded the protection of international law in an inter-
national forum.72
69. As reported in 69 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, 15 Jan. 1971, at 35, Senator Henry
Bellmon (R-Okla.) said ". . . our Government should help OPEC to sell oil 'at good
prices,'" and further that . . . "the U.S. should 'help, not harm these nations' efforts
to help themselves. "
70. See, Communique of Washington Energy Conference, Feb. 13, 1974, 13 INT'L
LEGAL MATS. 462 (1974).
71. The Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the General Assembly reflect
these recriminations. See, for example, Address by Mr. William R. Tolbert, President
of the Republic of Liberia to the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly,
2209th Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/PV 2209.
72. As one expert expressed it: "What is required is an entirely new legal-
diplomatic effort, of the same magnitude as the on-going law of the Sea Conference.
The importance of pricing to the world's economic stability is evident from the state
of Italy's economy as well as that of numerous other nations, both industrialized and
non-industrialized." Muir, The Changing Legal Framework of International Energy
Management, 9 INT'L LAW. 613 (1975).
